Columbia Law School

Scholarship Archive
Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
Staff Publications

Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment

3-2021

Transparency for Whom? Grounding Land Investment
Transparency in the Needs of Local Actors
Sam Szoke-Burke
Columbia Law School, Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment, sburke1@law.columbia.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/
sustainable_investment_staffpubs
Part of the Agriculture Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, European Law Commons,
Human Rights Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons, International Law Commons,
Land Use Law Commons, Oil, Gas, and Mineral Law Commons, Securities Law Commons, and the
Transnational Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Sam Szoke-Burke, Transparency for Whom? Grounding Land Investment Transparency in the Needs of
Local Actors, (2021).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/sustainable_investment_staffpubs/192

This Report/Policy Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment at Scholarship Archive. It has been accepted for inclusion in Columbia Center on Sustainable
Investment Staff Publications by an authorized administrator of Scholarship Archive. For more information, please
contact scholarshiparchive@law.columbia.edu.

TRANSPARENCY
FOR WHOM?
GROUNDING LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY
IN THE NEEDS OF LOCAL ACTORS
REPORT MARCH 2021

TABLE OF CONTENTS

2 |

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

4

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

5

PART I. FRAMING

8

How can transparency improve the governance and accountability of land investments?
The problem
The relevance of politics and power
Grounding transparency in community perspectives
Report overview

8
8
9
9
10

What is land investment transparency?
The definition: disclosure, access, comprehension, use, and open processes
Government duties concerning transparency
The business case for transparency

10
10
10
11

The actors: communities, allies, and gatekeepers

11

PART II. LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY FOR COMMUNITIES AND THEIR ALLIES

13

Information disclosure
Information access
Information comprehension
Open processes and information use

13
14
14
15

PART III. GATEKEEPER INCENTIVES REGARDING TRANSPARENCY

16

Host governments
Companies
Lenders and equity investors

17
18
19

PART IV. WHAT RISKS CAN LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY INTRODUCE?

20

Risks of land loss
Risks to community members

20
20

PART V. CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED BY COMMUNITIES AND THEIR ALLIES

22

Disclosure challenges
Information is not disclosed early enough
Some information is never disclosed
A lack of proactive disclosure puts burdens on communities
Disclosed information may be inaccurate, as part of “information wars”

22
22
23
23
23

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

TRANSPARENCY FOR WHOM? GROUNDING LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY IN THE NEEDS OF LOCAL ACTORS

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Access challenges
Information, when disclosed, often remains inaccessible
Decision-makers are inaccessible

23
23
23

Comprehension challenges
Communities often start with a low understanding of their rights and other legal issues
Disclosed information is hard to understand

24
24
24

Information use (and broader governance) challenges
Governments privilege company information over community information and make poor decisions
Regulators often neglect their mandate
Good faith regulators are undermined
Communities do not control whether or not a project takes place
Information and participation can be used by gatekeepers to dampen pressure for systemic change
Existing initiatives privilege elite perspectives, rarely meeting community needs

24
24
24
25
25
25
25

PART VI. RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGES: STRATEGIES TO ADVANCE MORE
EFFECTIVE LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY

28

1. Driving agendas with community-led processes
2. Increasing technical support for communities
3. Empowering good faith regulators
4. Implementing multi-stakeholder and participatory processes
5. Factoring community-generated information into investment-related decisions
6. Initiating domestic mechanisms to increase public access to information
7. Extending community participation beyond projects to the policy level

29
29
30
30
31
32
32

PART VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

34

METHODOLOGY
ANNEX: WHAT INFORMATION IS NEEDED?
ENDNOTES

37
38
40

LIST OF BOXES & FIGURES
BOX 1 The elements of land investment transparency explained
BOX 2 The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
BOX 3 The EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) program

10
26
27

FIGURE 1 The elements of land investment transparency
FIGURE 2 How each strategy can help advance land investment transparency

11
33

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

| 3

WHO IS THIS REPORT FOR?
This report is for donors, global policy makers, and civil society actors concerned with “land investments,” which are
defined as agriculture, forestry, wind and solar energy, and similar projects. In particular, it is for such actors who seek
to improve the governance and accountability of land investments, protect and bolster the rights of project-affected
communities, and enhance development outcomes linked to land investments. For actors already working on
advancing transparency of land investments, this report offers new insights for achieving transformative change.

Acronym Glossary
CCSI - Columbia Center on Sustainable Investment
DFI - Development Finance Institution
EITI - Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
FLEGT - Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade program
FPIC - Free, Prior and Informed Consent

IFC - International Finance Corporation
LIT - Land Investment Transparency
OPIC - Overseas Private Investment Corporation
RSPO - Roundtable on Sustainable Palm Oil
VPA - Voluntary Partnership Agreement
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

How can transparency improve the governance and accountability of “land
investments,” such as agriculture, forestry, wind and solar energy, and similar projects?
Land investments have long been characterized by poor governance and
accountability, which is often exacerbated by inadequate information sharing and the
exclusion of communities from decisions that will affect them. The Covid-19 crisis
amplified these challenges. Governments fast tracked project approvals to the
exclusion of communities and intensified criminalization and persecution of rights
defenders. Reductions in government monitoring of investments were accompanied
by opportunistic regulatory rollbacks. Opaque actions taken during the fog of the
pandemic will have long-term implications, including an increased risk of social conflict,
imperiling recovery efforts and even increasing the risk of governmental collapse.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Transparency is often seen as a means of improving
governance and accountability. But its transformative
potential can be hindered by vagueness concerning how
“transparency” is defined and who it is intended to serve.
Transparency is too often used interchangeably—and
erroneously—with “disclosure,” effectively protecting powerful
actors from changes in the status quo. Existing transparency
and governance initiatives also fall short on meeting
communities’ transparency needs, precisely because such
initiatives focus on other beneficiaries, such as commodity
buyers or international civil society actors.
This report seeks to re-orient conceptions of transparency in
ways that can lead to more transformative impacts—
particularly for local rights holders—in the governance of land.
Reorienting understandings of what land investment
transparency means can also benefit governments,
companies, and other actors by enabling them to more
effectively manage operational risk linked to social conflict and
community opposition.
THE DEFINITION
“Land investment transparency” (LIT) is public disclosure of
relevant land investment-related information, as well as the
ability of people to access, understand, and use that
information. LIT entails an ecosystem of open systems and
processes, in which project-affected community members can
participate and influence decisions that will affect them. These
elements can support community members in exercising their
rights, anticipating and avoiding negative impacts, resolving
grievances, seeking redress, and driving their own development.
Governments have a legal duty to ensure land investment
transparency, which is based in the binding norms of
international human rights law. In addition, companies and
investors have responsibilities to respect human rights, which
means that they, too, must work proactively to advance the
components of LIT within their control.
RELEVANT ACTORS
This report divides the actors relevant to land investment
transparency into two groups:
1. Project-affected communities and the actors who
support them. This group is often sidelined from
investment-related decision-making. It includes all
community members, not only leaders, and allies such
as Indigenous and peasant organizations, civil society
organizations, and paralegals and other experts
supporting communities.

6 |
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2. “Gatekeepers.” These actors control access to relevant
information and how policy and decision-making
processes around land investments function.
Gatekeepers include host governments, companies
carrying out land investments, as well as lenders, equity
investors, and other actors in the investment chain.
CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED BY COMMUNITIES AND THEIR
ALLIES
Communities, their allies, and other actors experience a range
of challenges, which diminish land investment transparency.
Disclosures fall short. Information is usually not disclosed early
enough, and some information and documents are never
disclosed. A lack of proactive disclosure puts the burden on
communities to track down information, exposing them to
additional risks and costs. Disclosed information can also be
inaccurate, used by gatekeepers as part of “information wars.”
Communities struggle to access information. Information,
when disclosed by gatekeepers, often does not reach
communities. Instead it can remain inaccessible in faraway
government buildings or online. Gatekeepers, too, are often
inaccessible for community members, limiting communities’
ability to obtain key information.
More is needed to enable communities to understand
available information. Communities often start with a low
understanding of their rights and other technical issues, which
can impair their ability to obtain and understand information
about proposed projects. When technical information is
disclosed, it can remain incomprehensible unless gatekeepers
or others take the time to summarize, translate, and convert it
into a form that can be understood by community members.
Communities face barriers to using information and to
participating in open decision-making processes. One limiting
factor to communities’ use of information is that investmentrelated decisions are often made behind closed doors, without
community participation. In addition, the ability of
communities to use information to influence decision-making
is regularly undermined by their lack of leverage. This is linked
to governments’ reluctance to recognize community land
rights or their rights to free, prior and informed consent, which
would enable communities to influence or control whether or
not projects take place and on what terms. Communities are
regularly faced with governments that rely on company
information to the detriment of community perspectives, and
with regulators that often neglect their mandates, thus
undermining accountability. Although good faith regulators
and other “reformers” within government can help to bolster
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community participation in decision-making, those
government actors are also frequently undermined by more
powerful actors. Less obviously, communities seeking to use
information to influence decisions may find that gatekeepers
may sometimes cede to community requests for information
and participation merely as a strategy to dampen pressure for
deeper systemic changes.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The big picture
Donors, global policy makers, and civil society organizations
should:
•

Conceive of transparency as extending beyond
disclosure, to include community access,
comprehension, and use of information in open
decision-making processes and governance systems.

•

Ground transparency efforts in the needs of
communities and other local actors.

•

Support or implement transparency efforts that seek to
navigate, change, or circumvent political barriers.

•

Strategically support or implement transparency
programming when it is needed to complement—or to
fill voids created by the blockage of—more
transformational frameworks for improving the
governance and accountability of land investments,
such as human rights, access to justice, and the
protection of legitimate tenure rights.

Concrete strategies
Various strategies can be employed to improve aspects of land
investment transparency, provided they are adapted to the
local context and do not introduce unacceptable risks for
communities.i Gatekeepers may resist such strategies. Actors
who understand gatekeeper incentivesii can more effectively:
identify appropriate openings for improvement; change the
political context to remove barriers imposed by gatekeepers;
or circumvent gatekeepers to achieve desired results through
other actors or means.
Donors, global policy makers, and civil society organizations can
contribute to the effective use of each strategy. In broad terms:
•

Donors can support the effective implementation of
these strategies.

•

Global policy makers can underscore when and how
international norms support or even require such
strategies and can incorporate such strategies in their
activities when appropriate.

•

Civil society organizations can raise awareness about,
support communities to use, and advocate for
gatekeeper acceptance of, such strategies.

Strategy 1: Driving agendas with community-led processes,
such as autonomous protocols, bylaws or development plans.
By using such processes to articulate how decisions should be
made concerning their lands, resources, and development,
communities can directly grapple with political barriers to
increased transparency.
Strategy 2: Increasing technical support for communities.
Communities that have access to the support they need can
more easily access, understand, and use information to
influence decisions and participate in land governance.
Strategies to secure private sector funding for independent
support can increase the amount of support available to
communities.
Strategy 3: Empowering good faith regulators. Communities’
ability to access and understand information and influence
investment-related decisions can be bolstered when regulators
are empowered and incentivized to faithfully carry out their
mandates.
Strategy 4: Implementing multi-stakeholder and
participatory processes. When appropriate, multi-stakeholder
dialogues or joint monitoring or fact-finding can create new
avenues for communities to obtain relevant information, share
their perspectives, and seek to understand and influence
decision-makers.
Strategy 5: Factoring community-generated information into
investment-related decisions. By generating their own
information, communities can break gatekeepers’ control over
the information upon which decisions are made.
Strategy 6: Initiating domestic mechanisms to increase
public access to information. Mechanisms like right-toinformation laws and parliamentary-approval processes can
help to increase disclosures and make investment-related
decision-making more accountable to rights holders and their
representatives.
Strategy 7: Extending community participation beyond
individual projects to the policy level. Communities who can
influence laws and policies can help systematically improve
legal requirements for more effective disclosure and
community access, comprehension, and use of information in
open decision-making processes.

NOTES
i

Risks of increased transparency are discussed at pages 20–21.

ii

Gatekeepers incentives are explored at pages 16–19.
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Farm worker, Mali.
© Shutterstock/Riccardo Mayer.

PART 1
FRAMING

HOW CAN TRANSPARENCY IMPROVE THE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
OF LAND INVESTMENTS?
Transparency is often seen as a means to important ends, such as improving
governance and accountability. But its potential to do so can be hindered by
vagueness concerning what transparency means and who it is intended to serve. This
report therefore seeks to re-orient conceptions of transparency in ways that can lead
to more transformative impacts—for local rights holders, and other actors—in the
governance of land.
The problem
Despite the important efforts behind a raft of court cases, campaigns, and other hardwon commitments for improved land governance, communities continue to be
sidelined in the planning and implementation of land investments. Communities also
8 |

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

TRANSPARENCY FOR WHOM? GROUNDING LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY IN THE NEEDS OF LOCAL ACTORS

bear the brunt of poorly designed projects, which can place
their human rights, livelihoods, and, in many cases, lives, at risk.
Excluding communities from investment-related decisionmaking processes not only produces devastating outcomes for
communities: it can also result in conflict and other challenges
that are extremely damaging for companies, debt and equity
investors, and host governments, among others.
The Covid-19 crisis amplified existing dynamics around land
investments. It provided an excuse for the fast tracking of
project approvals to the exclusion of communities1 and
intensified criminalization and persecution of rights
defenders.2 Reductions in government monitoring of
investments3 were followed by opportunistic rollbacks of
important legal protections.4 Untransparent actions taken
during the fog of the pandemic will have long-term
implications, including an increased risk of social conflict,5
imperiling recovery efforts and even increasing the risk of
governmental collapse.6
The relevance of politics and power
The current state of land investment reveals that powerful
actors like host governments and companies are often not
sufficiently incentivized to meaningfully include communities
in decisions affecting them. The problem is in part political.
Few actors are willing to cede power. Any attempts to advance
transparency must therefore take power seriously. Political
barriers to transparency and power imbalances are also
inherently linked to broader structural challenges that shape
the governance of land investment, which include conflicting
visions of development, overlaps in mandates and agendas,
skills and resource shortages, other failures to implement
existing laws and policies, and continuing threats to human
rights and civic space.
So how can transparency help?
Framing certain interventions through the lens of transparency
may help to dismantle the systemic barriers that prevent local
communities from knowledgably participating in the
governance of their lands and resources.7 Transparency is often
more accepted by powerful actors than other approaches to
improving governance. For instance, calls for governments and
companies to respect human rights are often sidelined or
ignored. Likewise, calls to recognize and protect communal
tenure are regularly subject to intense resistance from elite
actors,8 or to alternative pushes for land privatization.9
Transparency, on the other hand, is often invoked in processes
and interventions when protections for communal land tenure
and human rights are notably and regretfully excluded—such
as in trade agreements (see Box 3, below), and aid and
financing assistance from the Bretton Woods Institutions.10

This report does not advocate for the abandonment of human
rights, accountability, or protections of communal tenure in
donor and development programming. Instead, it explores
how transparency can complement those programmatic
focuses where they are likely to be resisted. Transparency is
best viewed as one piece of a suite of measures needed to
ensure accountable and responsive governance of land and
land investments. Such measures also include efforts to
bolster the empowerment and agency of local stakeholders,
and to hold misbehaving actors to account.11 Empowered and
informed communities, recognized and respected human
rights, and open and accountable decision-making systems
can in turn improve governance outcomes for all actors.
Yet transparency is too often used interchangeably—and
erroneously—with “disclosure.” This, too, is often due to political
factors. Transparency initiatives may settle for advancing
disclosure as the “lowest common denominator” issue to which
powerful actors will agree (see Box 2, below).12 Such actors can
respond to popular pressure for transparency by disclosing certain
information, but without opening up spaces for communities to
pursue substantive changes to how decisions are made.13 A thin
version of “transparency” is thus advanced, while the underlying
challenges around power imbalances and a lack of
accountability remain unaddressed. Deepening understandings
of what land investment transparency means can help unlock
its potential for transformative change for investment-affected
communities. Such change can also benefit governments and
companies who can better avoid or mitigate the considerable
costs of community grievances and social conflict.
Grounding transparency in community perspectives
Rather than assuming that transparency in itself will help
improve governance or accountability,14 initiators of
transparency interventions need to ask the question, “for
whom?”15 When transparency efforts have commodity buyers
(see Box 3, below) or international actors (see Box 2, below) as
their intended beneficiaries, their potential for enabling
communities to better access, understand, and use
information in open decision-making processes is reduced.
This can also limit the ability of such efforts to bolster rights
protections and facilitate sustainable development. This
report therefore builds on existing research on the
transparency of land-based investment16 and emerging rights
holder-focused approaches17 to further ground conceptions of
transparency in the perspectives of local actors.
Rather than assuming that transparency in itself will help
improve governance or accountability, initiators of transparency
interventions need to ask the question, “for whom?”
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
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Report overview

WHAT IS LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY?

This report draws on desktop research, country research in
Cameroon and Liberia, and interviews with communities, civil
society, government, the private sector, and development
finance institutions (DFIs) from around the world. Insights
drawn from interviews are either signposted in the text or
referenced with endnotes. More information is included under
Methodology, page 37, below.

The definition: disclosure, access, comprehension, use,
and open processes

The report starts by defining land investment transparency (LIT),
explaining its links to governments’ obligations, and outlining how
it benefits a range of actors. The report then examines two groups
of relevant actors: (1) communities and their civil society allies,
and (2) “gatekeepers” to information and decision-making
processes (such as host governments, companies, and lenders).
In the following section, the report unpacks each element of
transparency, namely disclosure, as well as information access,
comprehension, and use in open processes. To enable a politically
informed understanding of openings for advancing transparency,
the report then describes the potential incentives that motivate
gatekeepers. The risks of increased transparency are also
investigated. The report then sets out a range of transparencyrelated challenges that communities and their allies experience.
Next, the report proposes various strategies and approaches that
hold the prospect of improving or advancing land investment
transparency, before concluding with recommendations for
donors, global policy-makers, and civil society organizations.

“Land investment transparency” (LIT) is public disclosure of
relevant land investment-related information, as well as the
ability of people to access, understand, and use that
information.18 LIT therefore entails an ecosystem of open systems
and processes, in which project-affected community members
can participate and influence decisions that will affect them.
These elements can support community members in exercising
their rights, anticipating and avoiding negative impacts, resolving
grievances, seeking redress for negative impacts suffered or rights
violated, and, ultimately, more effectively pursuing their own
vision of sustainable development.19
Government duties concerning transparency
Governments have a legal duty to ensure land investment
transparency, which is based in the binding norms of international
human rights law.20 LIT is grounded in various human rights,21
including the freedom to seek and receive information,22 the right
to take part in public affairs,23 and the right to an effective
remedy.24 Other human rights that serve as bases for LIT include
human rights to property and resources,25 development,26
culture,27 health,28 a healthy environment,29 and food,30 as well as
the international rights of Indigenous and tribal peoples.31

BOX 1: THE ELEMENTS OF LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY EXPLAINED
• Public disclosure refers to the sharing of all relevant information with rights holders and the public at large through
a variety of media.
• Access refers to the ability of communities and other actors to safely obtain the relevant information. It includes
measures that bridge the gulf that can exist between remote communities, on the one hand, and information
holders and repositories, on the other.
• Understanding information entails the information being shared or converted into a comprehensible format for
rights holders, including being translated to local languages and appropriate complexity levels, and otherwise
adjusted to local contexts and cultures. It also means having sufficient time and technical support to digest both
the information and the broader context of rights, processes, and drivers for the investment.
• Information use and open systems and processes are inherently linked. Communities who are informed and able
to access relevant decision-making processes and other governance systems before decisions are made have the
best chances of effectively participating in and influencing them. Such processes include investment planning and
project authorization processes, government systems for monitoring and enforcement, and the resolution of
community grievances. Other relevant systems include those driving the development of public policies and laws,
right-to-information processes, and justice systems.

10 |
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FIGURE 1: THE ELEMENTS OF LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY

Disclosure
All relevant, accurate information is
shared and made public in a timely
manner.

Info Access
Communities and other actors can
safely obtain the relevant information.

Communities can access
decision-making processes and
knowledgeably influence them.
More generally governance
systems are open and
democratically responsive.

Info Use &
Open Systems

Information is in understandable formats,
including being translated to local languages,
adjusted to appropriate levels of complexity, and
calibrated for the local context and culture.
Communities have sufficient time to digest
information and can access technical support.

Comprehension
Source: Sam Szoke-Burke and Michael Morgan.

The legal obligations linked to those human rights mean that
governments have duties to proactively advance transparency.
Advancing transparency should thus be seen as a core
component of government agencies’ mandates. Poor
government performance on transparency is not, then, simply
unfortunate, but rather a dereliction of legal obligations. In
addition, company and investor responsibilities to respect
human rights mean that they too must work proactively to
advance the components of LIT within their control.
The business case for transparency
While LIT clarifies various obligations and responsibilities for
governments, companies, and other actors—for instance,
concerning disclosure and participatory decision-making—it
can also produce advantageous outcomes for them. When
communities are informed and participate in decisions as
empowered counter-parties, companies can better
understand local perspectives and circumstances and more
effectively manage risks of rights violations, costly local
conflict, and associated project delays and failure.32 Lenders
and equity investors also benefit from such outcomes, which
minimize their financial, legal, and reputational risks.

For governments, these outcomes minimize the risks of adverse
legal claims from investors, tarnished national reputations as an
investment destination, and the undermining of the
government’s political legitimacy among its constituents and
institutional partners. LIT can improve operational outcomes for
governments, as well: it can strengthen intra-governmental
coordination and knowledge sharing, which in turn can enhance
decisions, policy making, and performance of public mandates.
LIT can also help governments with environmental stewardship:
for instance, recent research reveals correlations between prior
consultation requirements and reduced rates of deforestation.33
THE ACTORS: COMMUNITIES, ALLIES, AND GATEKEEPERS
This report divides the actors relevant to land investment
transparency into two groups. The first group is project-affected
communities and the actors who support them. This group is
often sidelined from investment-related decision-making, and
communities left to suffer the negative impacts afterwards. The
second, “gatekeepers,” are the actors that control access to
relevant information and how policy and decision-making
processes around land investments function.34 They often
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
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control the degree to which communities can knowledgably
participate in decisions, and may actively or inadvertently
restrict opportunities for systemic change.

Communities and their allies
“Communities affected by land investments” include formal
community representatives such as chiefs and elders, as well
as all other community members, including groups like
women, youth, people with disabilities, Indigenous peoples,
and minority ethnic groups. This includes communities and
community members who have legitimate tenure rights over
lands and resources, as well as all community members whose
human rights are, or stand to be, affected by land investment
projects. The unique transparency needs of community groups
such as workers linked to land investment projects35 and smallscale producers who sell commodities to companies are
outside the scope of this report.36
Community allies are those who support project-affected
communities. Allies may accompany or provide technical
support to communities from the earliest stages of project
proposal right through to pursuing justice or redress for rights
violations and negative impacts. Allies can also include those
advocating on project-affected communities’ behalf in broader
policy contexts. Allies therefore include: Indigenous and
peasant organizations; social movements; local, regional,
national, and international civil society organizations; as well
as paralegals, scientists, and other experts providing technical
support to communities. Allies can be distinguished from other
data intermediaries whose objectives are not necessarily
subservient to those of communities, such as journalists and
open data initiatives—although there may often be overlap
between these two groups.37
Gatekeepers
The gatekeepers this report focuses on are:
•

Host governments, including public entities and actors at
local, regional or national levels tasked with attracting,
screening, monitoring, and regulating land investments.

•

Companies and individuals who carry out land investments.

•

Investment chain actors, including lenders to, and
equity investors in, land investments. Such actors are
diverse, ranging from pension funds, investment funds,
and other asset owners, global banks, multilateral and
country DFIs, local financial institutions, and impact
investors, among many others.

12 |
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Other gatekeepers who can have influence over the
advancement of transparency include export credit agencies,
which provide insurance against political and other types of
non-commercial risk, and supply chain actors, including
buyers and traders of commodities produced in land
investment projects.38 While not a principal focus of this report,
such actors also have the potential to block or advance LIT.
Overlap
Each of these groups can occupy the other side of the coin in
specific cases: gatekeepers need information, while
communities and their allies control access to certain
information. Certain individuals may also fall into both groups.
For host governments, companies, and other gatekeepers,
compliance with their respective human rights duties and
responsibilities will also often depend in part on their ability to
access, understand, and use relevant information. Government
representatives without relevant information are more likely to
make poor decisions and are less able to properly regulate
investment. Companies that lack important information are
more likely to ignore community perspectives and to make
under-informed decisions that lead to mutually disadvantageous
outcomes. Although not the focus of this report, insights
concerning these actors’ information needs—and the
importance of their using such information—are also shared.
Communities and their allies can also occupy the space of
gatekeepers, especially regarding information generated by
the community: see 5. Factoring community-generated
information into investment-related decisions, below.
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PART II
LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY
FOR COMMUNITIES AND THEIR ALLIES

This section unpacks the key elements of land investment transparency: disclosure,
access, understanding, and use in open systems and processes.
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
Public disclosure refers to the sharing of information with rights holders and the public
at large. Disclosure should usually be public, rather than only to communities and their
allies, in order to reinforce broader governance and accountability measures, and also
in recognition of the rights of all citizens to information.39 Governmental duties to
disclose come from their international human rights law obligations and often from
domestic laws and constitutions. Companies and investment chain actors’
responsibilities to respect human rights create responsibilities to disclose; companies
may also be required to disclose by host or home government laws and by loan
agreement conditions. Investment chain actors may disclose project-related
information according to their own right to information or disclosure policies.
COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT
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For disclosure to have any impact, the information disclosed
must be relevant and useful to the intended users of that
information.40 Such information must also be accurate,
definitive, and up-to-date, necessitating regular, timely
updates. Disclosure should be proactive, to avoid communities
and allies investing significant effort and resources into
information requests.
Communities and their allies may need a diverse set of
documents and types of information in order to protect
community rights and knowledgably influence decisions
concerning community lands and resources. A comprehensive
list of information and document types is included in the
Annex, below. In summary, communities and allies may need
a range of information and documents concerning:
•

Rights and responsibilities of all relevant actors,
relevant decision-making processes, and other elements
of legal frameworks.

•

The proposed land investment project, including its
purpose, location and timespan, and projected potential
positive and negative impacts (which may be included in
impact assessment reports).

•

The company (or companies) carrying out the project.

•

Investment chain actors linked to the project.

•

Buyers of commodities produced by the project and
other value chain actors.

•

Available avenues for grievance redress.

•

The terms of rents and other transfers to be made to the
community.

•

Regular, timely, and meaningfully disaggregated
disclosure and reporting on company performance and
impacts, once the project begins.

•

What happens after the project ends, including who
ownership of the land reverts to, how resulting damage
to the land is repaired and remediated, and what
happens to any community “benefit” sharing
arrangements.

Communities will usually be especially interested in
information about projects or decisions concerning nearby
lands and resources.41 The specific information needs of each
community, and members within it, however, will vary
depending on their objectives and the strategies they wish to
pursue, as well as other context-specific factors.
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INFORMATION ACCESS
The benefits of information disclosure are dramatically
reduced if relevant communities cannot easily access that
information. To enable meaningful information access,
gatekeepers’ disclosure strategies should plan for how the
information will reach communities.42 This means moving
beyond posting documents online or including copies in
distant administrative buildings. Effective strategies for
information delivery include meetings, consultations, and
dialogue processes with communities, who may need
technical assistance in order to know what information to ask
for. Enabling anonymous means of obtaining information,
such as through radio broadcasts, can also increase
information access in repressive or polarized settings. Efforts
to ensure access also should be iterative for projects spanning
long periods of time, as documents can easily be lost,
especially if held by a community leader who passes away or
whose formal term ends.43
INFORMATION COMPREHENSION
Communities that access disclosed information also need to
be able to make sense of it. Enabling community
comprehension of information entails converting raw data into
information, adjusting it into an understandable form, and
facilitating (and funding) access to other institutional supports
needed to digest the information, such as technical assistance.
In addition, sufficient time should be allowed for the
community to digest the information, deliberate internally, and
access technical support. A community member’s ability to
understand information may depend on translation into local
languages, having complex information summarized, and
adjusting information to cultural and societal contexts.
Challenges such as low literacy levels, a lack of previous
experience with large-scale investment, and low legal
knowledge must also be navigated (for instance, by using
audiovisual media) or addressed (for instance, by facilitating
independent legal education and empowerment).
Gatekeepers should often bear the onus for enabling
community comprehension. This includes demystifying both
data and pathways for participation in decisions and redress.
Technical documents also require explanation; for instance, a
200-page management plan would need to be summarized
and converted into a comprehensible form for community
members (while also being disclosed in full for use by the
community and its allies).
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Examples of accessible, user-focused ways for gatekeepers to
present complex information include:
•

Plain language presentations and dialogue.

•

Plain-language document summaries and annotations.44

•

Visits to other projects that are either run by the
company or otherwise comparable.

•

Facilitating story sharing from other contexts, such as
enabling communities to speak with, or receive video
postcards from, other project-affected communities.45

•

3D models and before-and-after images of the project’s
likely impacts on the landscape.46

OPEN PROCESSES AND INFORMATION USE
A crucial element of transparency is the ability of communities,
with support from their allies, to use information in order to
influence decisions, hold actors to account, and pursue their
own vision of development. This element has two parts. First,
decision-making and governance systems must be open and
accessible to communities. Second, communities must be
able to effectively participate in and influence those processes
and systems, which entails communities having the
information, understanding, and, if needed, technical support
to do so. Effective community participation in investmentrelated decision-making and governance should be facilitated
throughout the life cycle of an investment, as part of a selfreinforcing loop of communication, participation in decisions,
and accountability.
Critical to enabling effective community participation in
decision-making is timeliness. Communities too often receive
information after important decisions have been made, or are
not given enough time to properly digest and respond to
information. Key moments for informed community use of
information vary depending on factors such as applicable legal
frameworks and how the project is financed. Communities
need to be able to access information sufficiently in advance
of such moments to be able to digest the information and
respond accordingly. Some examples of key moments include:
•

The adoption of relevant laws and policies concerning
land investment.

•

The zoning or earmarking of community lands for
external investment.

•

Initial expressions of interest in that land by potential
investors.

•

The undertaking of due diligence, impact assessments,
and other preparatory studies for a proposed project.

•

The negotiation of any agreements (including
memoranda of understanding that are then used by
companies to obtain finance) and the granting of every
relevant authorization or permit.

•

The implementation of the project, including any
resettlement, compensation, and benefit sharing
processes.

•

The detection of any negative impacts, rights violations,
or community grievances.

•

The decision to terminate or wind-down the project.

Yet community action will often not fit neatly into any one
moment. Communities will have needs for information and for
opportunities to influence decisions throughout the duration
of any projects that proceed. Sometimes information use by
communities and their allies take place in other, less definable,
“moments,” such as when communities take steps to
understand external demands for their lands and formulate
community policies and protocols, or when they collaborate
with civil society organizations on alternative, communitydriven models of development.47
Community members and allies also reported using available
information to inform and update government regulators and
lenders. For example, communities and allies recounted that
a regulatory agency would often welcome their efforts to
inform it of company breaches of laws. Another civil society
representative recalled discovering that a controversial dam
project was financed, through an intermediary, by a DFI. That
institution reportedly only found about local anger about the
project, which was eventually abandoned, when the
community brought a complaint under the lender’s
accountability mechanism.
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Rice farming in central Madagascar.
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PART III
GATEKEEPER INCENTIVES
REGARDING TRANSPARENCY

Power affects the potential impact of any effort to improve governance and
accountability. This is particularly true in the context of land investments, where
immense power imbalances exist between communities and their allies, on the one
hand, and gatekeepers on the other. Where political barriers exist, interventions can
seek to:

16 |

•

Navigate the existing political context and find openings for advancing LIT;

•

Change the political context to remove barriers to the advancement of LIT; or

•

Circumvent actors creating political barriers to the advancement of LIT and
achieve desired results through other actors or means.48
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This section sets out gatekeepers’ likely incentives and
disincentives to understand where such barriers may lie. Where
different gatekeepers’ incentives vary or conflict, the most
powerful actors usually influence, if not control, ultimate
outcomes. Of course, contexts vary tremendously and are also
subject to change, making it impossible to universally pin
down the incentives of different actors.49 Relatedly, institutions
and the individuals within them may have differing incentives,
further complicating the calculus. Nonetheless, a general
understanding of likely motives can help to anticipate
gatekeeper reactions to calls for the advancement of LIT and
to identify especially fruitful avenues for improvement.
HOST GOVERNMENTS
Actors within government
Restrictive attitudes to disclosure and to community
participation in decision-making processes are more often
attributed to entities that promote and facilitate land-based
investment, including: investment promotion agencies;
ministries of agriculture, forestry, and/or renewable energy;
ministries of economy and finance; and special economic zone
authorities, among others.50 Such actors’ incentives may align
with those of the executive and heads of government, who
may wish to use land investments to demonstrate their
prowess in catalyzing development,51 to consolidate political
control,52 or for personal enrichment.53
Entities focused on environmental and social issues (such as
ministries and agencies focused on environmental protection,
justice, and human rights) may view LIT more favorably, as a
tool to help them carry out their work.54 Parliamentarians,
when acting in good faith and independently from ruling
parties and the executive, may also view LIT as supporting their
role as a check on executive power.55
Local governments may see increased transparency as
desirable if they are excluded from decisions concerning
investment. However, local actors with concrete roles
concerning investment may instead block the advancement of
LIT,56 in which case national-level officials may be the ones
insisting on transparency as a means of asserting some
control.57 Where power is devolved to the chief level,
customary leaders may also eschew transparency, negotiating
privately with investors, even to the exclusion of government.58
Differing conceptions of development
Despite an international push for sustainability,59 top-down,
macro-economic conceptions of development still seem to
drive many government approaches to investment.60 Nationallevel government actors may view development in terms of

raw numbers, and as being dependent on private-sector
investments, potentially obscuring questions about land
ownership and food security in the process.61 Investment may
be seen an effective way to drive generation of gross domestic
product, which governments may view as the primary measure
of poverty eradication.62 Foreign investment also offers the
prospect of increasing a country’s current account balance,
reducing dependence on foreign credit and increasing access
to foreign currency.63 Such actors may regard disclosure and
informed community participation in decision-making
processes as causing unnecessary transaction costs and
delays;64 they may also dismiss mass resettlements, the overexploitation of water and forests, and the human rights
violations that investments often cause as mere externalities
that do not fundamentally alter the development calculus.65
Actors following such approaches are eager to protect
investors from undue scrutiny and to portray their country as
having smooth investment approval processes.66
Competition for power
Interviewees in many countries viewed their heads of state and
executive as controlling investment allocations. While contexts
vary, this generally resulted in top-down, opaque decisions, from
which communities were excluded.67 In Cameroon, for instance,
strict executive control over investment approvals rendered
subsequent requirements for consultations and impact
assessment mere afterthoughts, stripping them of any real
transformational potential.68 In Liberia, attempts were made to
erode environmental regulators’ influence by referring decisions
under such regulators’ purview to an inter-ministerial task force
composed of institutions with no environmental mandate.69
Struggles for power between government actors more
generally can lead to poor transparency outcomes for many
actors. Some agencies hoard information, forcing other
officials to ask companies for documents such as concession
contracts, or to rely on personal connections. Competition
between public agencies and actors has also produced poor
outcomes for investors,70 such as overlapping concessions
awarded by different agencies.71
Government actors’ power relationships with external actors
can also have transparency impacts. Governments may argue
that limiting information disclosure is a means of preserving
strategic advantage during negotiations with incoming
investors.72 Governments may also compete with other
countries in attracting investment, which can incentivize races
to the bottom concerning governance and transparency.73
More generally, governments will often face geopolitical
pressure, which can include pressure from other states
interested in seeing certain investments proceed.74
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Corruption and patronage
Opaque decision-making processes enable government actors
to procure illicit personal benefits in exchange for approvals or
favorable treatment.75 Unscrupulous actors with exclusive
access to relevant information or decision-making processes
may be incentivized to restrict community access, enabling
them to secure illicit personal benefits or establish patron-client
arrangements designed to accumulate or preserve control.76

companies to become less transparent. Companies may wish
to preserve legal “grey areas” that they do not want resolved.81
Alternatively, they may seek to avoid scrutiny of the company’s
beneficial ownership, which can expose techniques such as
transfer mispricing or the use of shadow companies to obtain
certification where the parent company remains uncertified
and unaccountable.82
Operational and financial risk

COMPANIES
Actors within companies
Different actors within companies will have different priorities
and agendas, as well as varying abilities to achieve their
intentions in practice. For instance, environmental and social
specialists will often grasp the need for stable community
relations but are often not involved in early processes in which
key decisions are made. On the other hand, actors that control
budget allocations and are charged with overall financial and
operational management of projects may be less sensitized to
community issues and more reluctant to change the status
quo.77 A CEO’s personal interest in advancing transparency may
be crucial to effecting transparency improvements across
company operations. In other cases, company approaches to
communities may vary, depending on each project’s individual
manager. Regular staff turnover can also undermine
companies’ ability to systematically improve how they interact
with communities.
Legal risk
Legal requirements are often a primary driver of company
behavior concerning LIT.78 Legal risk (arising from failures to
comply with legal requirements) can arise from the host
country’s domestic law, from contractual relationships
(including with lenders and insurers), and from companies’
home states.
Legal risk may fail to motivate company action where there is
a lack of meaningful consequences for company breaches of
legal requirements. For instance, one civil society
representative lamented the lack of “teeth” of the International
Finance Corporation (IFC)’s disclosure requirements for its
clients.79 Likewise, transparency requirements may be ignored
or poorly implemented by local, politically connected
companies, which may instead rely on their connections with
powerful government officials to secure authorizations.80 Their
political connections may also render them less concerned
about the prospect of prosecution for criminal acts.
Perceptions of legal risk may even incentivize unscrupulous
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Land-based investments face significant risks linked to tenure
and community relations. The grievances of communities who
were excluded or suffered adverse impacts, whose legitimate
tenure rights were ignored, or whose expectations were not
fulfilled, can transform into conflict, costly interruptions to
production, legal challenges, stranded assets, and termination
or abandonment.83 Community grievances have also led to the
revocation of host government authorizations.84 Investing in
local engagement processes and two-way communication,
obtaining free, prior and informed consent (FPIC), and
establishing grievance mechanisms have been revealed as
crucial tools to mitigate the risks of costly community conflict.85
Many industry representatives interviewed concurred,
although almost all preferred to speak about information
sharing and dialogue rather than FPIC. One former
agribusiness representative viewed conflict with a local
community as “tak[ing] up a lot of energy and oxygen and
tak[ing] away from other aspects of the business,” echoing
evidence from the mining sector.86 Meaningful, two-way
communication enables companies to adequately respond to
community concerns, while robust grievance mechanisms can
enable communities to channel their frustration through
productive, non-adversarial processes, rather than resorting
to litigation.
Interviewees also viewed informed community participation
in decision-making processes as helping companies to
effectively:
•

Manage legacy issues around land ownership. This
helped avoid perpetuating “confusion and resentment,
passed on from generation to generation.”87

•

Strengthen company access to and control of land.
Companies who disclose information about their right to
operate can demonstrate the bounds of their entitlement
to lands, reducing the risk of conflicting land claims.88

•

Stabilize smallholder supply. Companies may improve
LIT as part of their efforts to encourage collaborative
business relationships and partnerships with small-scale
producers.89
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Reputational risk

Financial risk

Some companies care about how they are perceived, both
externally (by investors, buyers, regulators, competitors, and
consumers) and internally (by employees).90 They may
therefore be open to improving their transparency practices to
avoid having their reputations tarnished by allegations of rights
violations or negative impacts. Yet reputation can also
motivate companies to act more opaquely. Interviewees from
civil society, a DFI, and an agribusiness acknowledged that
companies might view additional transparency as increasing
their vulnerability to damaging advocacy campaigns. This has
the potential to cause a vicious cycle, where practices that
exclude communities from decision-making lead to fallout that
then discourages company representatives from being more
transparent in the future.

Some lenders and investors perceive informed community
participation in decision-making processes as improving
operational risk management for the project. This is important,
as operational risk for companies translates to financial risk for
lenders (who seek to obtain interest on their loans) and for
equity investors (who seek to maximize the return on their
investment by increasing company value or income). The desire
of lenders and investors to avoid project failure and costly delays
can motivate them to require improved LIT of their investees.95
High-profile community conflict has also led to divestment
campaigns, causing financial institutions to lose major
institutional and individual customers.96 In addition, fall out
linked to community opposition has been linked to reduced
stock prices for publicly listed entities.97 Investor decisions to
withdraw from projects create administrative and exit costs, and
uncertainty for equity investors wishing to divest if no new buyer
can be found.98 Finally, lenders and investors may find
themselves on the hook to remediate rights violations.99

Profit and cost
Companies’ pursuit of profit and desire to save costs can be used
to argue both for or against enhancing disclosure and
community participation in decision-making processes.91 For
instance, a company could refuse to expand its community
engagement program in the name of cutting costs, but that could
ultimately increase the risk of community conflict that can have
significant financial costs.92 Likewise, companies may access new
markets by complying with certification schemes that themselves
require various elements of LIT. Nonetheless, various private
sector interviewees noted that companies do view LIT as
resource intensive without guaranteeing a project’s success.

Reputational risk
Related to financial risks, lenders and investors are sensitive
to negative publicity, which can affect perceptions from future
investees and customers.100 This can create a general aversion,
though not always, to irresponsible projects that can explode
into international media stories and complaints. Many
investors increasingly wish to bolster their reputations for
diligent screening and monitoring.101

LENDERS AND EQUITY INVESTORS

Industry trends

Actors within lenders and equity investors

Certain lenders and investors may also take cues from leading
actors on best practice. Here, the lead of DFIs, whose mandates
include advancing development, can help sensitize other
investors of the value in requiring informed community
participation in decision-making processes. For example, a
manager from an emerging market financial institution viewed
access to finance from DFIs as a big motivator for their
adoption of improved community engagement practices.
Likewise, a representative from an asset manager noted that
private sector investors were often more “fluent” in issues like
deforestation and climate change than in land-related or social
measures, indicating the need for DFI leadership on
community-facing issues.

Like companies, lenders and equity investors comprise actors
with varying degrees of sensitization to community issues, and
varying abilities to ultimately influence the actions of client
companies.
Legal risk
Conflict and grievances caused or facilitated by failures to ensure
informed community participation in decision-making increase
the chances of legal claims and formal grievances being brought
against both companies93 and their investors.94 These have led
to investors making financial settlements with communities.
Increased LIT can both head off potential claims and also act as
early warning signals for lenders and investors, enabling them to
take action before grievances escalate to litigation.
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PART IV
WHAT RISKS CAN LAND INVESTMENT
TRANSPARENCY INTRODUCE?

While land investment transparency holds the potential for better governance and
accountability, empowered communities, and the mitigation of social conflict,
increased transparency may also pose certain risks, which should be factored into
interventions and approaches.
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RISKS OF LAND LOSS

RISKS TO COMMUNITY MEMBERS

In certain cases, increased information about communities
and their lands may heighten the risks that communities could
lose control of those lands.102 Actors seeking land may be
attracted to areas where information about land holdings and
titles is easily accessible.103 Where formalization of community
land rights is done incrementally, gatekeepers may also
disingenuously claim that lands not yet titled are impliedly the
sole domain of the government—rather than acknowledging
that the processes of formally titling community lands are in
progress.104 In addition, increased knowledge of the value and
features of lands held by women and marginalized community
groups may increase the risk of powerful community elites
appropriating such lands—whether for themselves or to
allocate to investors.105

Information requests and participation in decision-making
processes by communities can also introduce risks to
community members, especially in repressive contexts with
limited civic space. Community members and allies who seek
to access information or advocate for community perspectives
to be included in decisions may become targets for retaliation
and criminalization. For instance, recent research highlights
that more than one third of recorded attacks on human rights
defenders in 2020 stemmed from failures to consult, or obtain
the FPIC of, communities.106 This risk illustrates the need to
avoid relying on “decontextualized ‘best practices’”107 and to
instead design and adapt transparency interventions to the
relevant context.

These risks of land loss reinforce the importance of conceiving
of transparency not only as disclosure, but also as including
informed and empowered community participation in
decision-making. The risks also highlight why transparency is
best viewed as a complement to broader reforms and efforts,
such as legal empowerment and the recognition and respect
of legitimate tenure rights.

Harvesting tea, Kenya. © Shutterstock/Jen Watson.
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PART V
CHALLENGES EXPERIENCED BY
COMMUNITIES AND THEIR ALLIES

This section sets out various common challenges experienced by communities and
their allies relating to disclosure and information access, comprehension, and use.
Such challenges are often the result of gatekeeper incentives playing out in practice.
These challenges can limit communities’ ability to knowledgably influence decisions
about investments and the governance of their lands and resources, and, ultimately,
to protect their rights and drive their own sustainable development.
DISCLOSURE CHALLENGES
Information is not disclosed early enough
The timing of information sharing remains a significant challenge for enabling informed
community participation in decisions. Communities need information to be disclosed
sufficiently in advance of key moments when decisions will be made in order to digest
that information, convene communally to identify priorities, and prepare to influence
22 |
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decisions.108 Information asymmetries will usually exist before
disclosure, with gatekeepers controlling to a large degree
whether or not communities are even aware that a project has
been proposed. This asymmetry demonstrates the need for
proactive disclosure, to alert communities of a potential project
and enable them to begin preparations. In addition to examples
of communities not hearing about a project until bulldozers
arrive on their lands,109 gatekeepers regularly fail to provide
communities with all relevant information sufficiently in
advance of key decision-making moments. For example, even
those governments and companies that eventually publish
copies of investor-state contracts tend to engage in minimal, if
any, information sharing about the negotiation process before
the contract is signed.110
Some information is never disclosed
In some cases, communities never find out the terms
governing an investment project. For instance, in Cameroon,
communities affected by plantations established in the 1960s
and 70s still have not obtained copies of applicable investorstate contracts, despite a national law requiring disclosure of
all natural resource investment contracts.111 Likewise, civil
society interviewees recounted examples where they
uncovered that impact assessments had not been conducted
after spending years requesting such documents.
In addition to breaching community rights to information,
gatekeeper refusals to disclose information can introduce new
risks for communities. For instance, communities and allies
may resort to informal and covert avenues to obtain
information,112 which introduce additional risks of reprisals,
concerns about accuracy, and challenges for keeping abreast
of new developments.
A lack of proactive disclosure puts burdens on communities
The above failures by gatekeepers to proactively disclose
information put the burden on communities and their allies to
obtain relevant information before key decisions are made.
This hinders communities’ ability to understand what is at
stake and to influence key decisions. Putting the onus on
communities to seek out information also creates demands in
terms of cost, time, and effort. Strategies employed by
communities and their allies to obtain information that was
not proactively disclosed include:
•

Making formal information requests to government under
right to information or freedom of information laws,113 and
purchasing documents from public agencies.114

•

Asking companies and other non-governmental
information-holders for information, often with reference
to community members’ rights to information, principles

of natural justice, or lender access-to-information
policies.115 (Other research has revealed a concerning
trend of companies refusing information requests by civil
society organizations acting on behalf of communities,
which creates additional costs for communities who
have to seek out the information themselves.116)
•

Directly observing activities or impacts.117

These measures are not always possible in certain contexts,
including where civic space is under attack and where
defenders face criminalization and reprisals.
Disclosed information may be inaccurate, fueling
“information wars”
When gatekeepers disclose information, there may be doubts as
to its accuracy or completeness.118 In extreme cases, misleading
or false information may be shared as part of what one civil society
representative called an “information war.” One community
member interviewed reported having to pay a government entity
for maps of mining concessions, and receiving maps it believed
the entity knew were out of date and inaccurate. These challenges
can further increase the amount of time needed for communities
to fully understand what is at stake and determine how they can
participate in decisions that have not been made.
ACCESS CHALLENGES
Information, when disclosed, often remains inaccessible
Where governments or companies do disclose documents and
other relevant information, these can remain out of reach for
communities. In some countries, for example, forestry
conventions are often published in hard copy in government
gazettes; these are only accessible in faraway government
buildings, unless unearthed by civil society actors who can
identify which of hundreds of gazette volumes contains the
relevant document. Communities and allies interviewed also
relied on media reports,119 online repositories of documents
administered by governments120 or other actors,121 and
company websites;122 though communities will often require
external support to be able to access such information sources.
Decision-makers are inaccessible
If communities want to influence relevant decisions, then
access to decision-makers within government, companies, and
investment chain actors is crucial. But communities often face
challenges in locating decision-makers. One community
representative, for example, said they could only access a
company’s local managers, making it harder to develop
working relationships with other company representatives who
might have the power to improve the company’s community
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engagement practices. Another community representative said
it was so difficult to find government decision-makers who were
adequately informed about an infrastructure project that
communities could not obtain consistent and reliable
information; this led to confusion about how the project would
affect them and whether or not they were entitled to participate
in decision-making concerning the project.
The way that a project is financed can also introduce barriers
to accessing decision-makers in investment chains. For
instance, communities can struggle to identify project lenders
and inform them about local challenges when finance is
opaquely routed through intermediary institutions.

“Poverty cannot be eliminated by people
who stay in their offices.”
— Community member
Source: International Accountability Project (IAP), Back to development: A call
for what development could be (2015), 81.

COMPREHENSION CHALLENGES
Communities often start with a low understanding of their
rights and other legal issues
Communities often do not start with a detailed understanding
of legal issues, which puts them at a disadvantage in claiming
their land and human rights, and in knowing what information
they are entitled to, how to get it, and how to participate in
decision-making. The law is often complex and inaccessible.
Different actors’ rights and responsibilities, and investmentrelated decision-making processes, are derived not only from
constitutions and laws, but also from contracts, permits, and
other documents. Many of these sources are often not publicly
accessible, and communities may struggle to understand how
different sources interact. Confusion relating to overlaps in
customary and formal laws can also be exploited by gatekeepers
to further discourage empowered community action.

Disclosed information is hard to understand
Communities will generally struggle to read and digest technical
documents spanning hundreds or thousands of pages. More
generally, communities without experience of large-scale
investment projects may struggle to grasp the implications of a
proposed project. Community and civil society representatives
reported a strong need for technical information to be
summarized and made easier to understand.124 Incoming
investment projects can also increase confusion about
community members’ land rights, as governments may change
how land is categorized to facilitate investments.125 Circumstances
can also change—such as authorizations either expiring or being
renewed—without communities being updated.126
INFORMATION USE (AND BROADER GOVERNANCE)
CHALLENGES
Governments privilege company information over
community information and make poor decisions
Governments tend to prioritize information provided by
companies to the detriment of information generated by
communities.127 This is problematic, as data is never neutral;
control and access to data brings with it “tremendous political
and ideological power.”128 Even map data can be manipulated
by the entity doing the mapping.129 If companies control what
will be measured, and how, they can influence how information
is portrayed and shape narratives in their favor. Poor decisions
are more likely to be made when community information, which
can signpost the risk of social conflict,130 is ignored.
One civil society interviewee lamented that information
collected and provided by communities is “discounted”
because of assumptions that the community will be selfinterested. That same interviewee expressed frustration that
company consultants are assumed to act with more
objectivity, referring to a case where consultants erroneously
concluded that land was “unoccupied and infertile” despite
obvious indications of community occupation and use.
Regulators often neglect their mandate

“ I can hear a chainsaw but how do I know if it’s legal?”
– Community member
Source: Project Completion Report - Making the Forest Sector Transparent,
Global Witness (2013)

“[The land law] gives communities the power
but they don’t understand”
– Community member, Kenya123
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Many relevant government regulators, such as national level
ministries, often do not maintain regular presences at project sites,
and therefore rely on information being shared with them by
companies, rather than robust monitoring and enforcement.131 This
can result in government agencies acting as “absentee regulators,”
ones that are often unaware of how projects are proceeding until
local unrest makes headlines. Relying on information produced by
the entity that is being regulated indicates a breakdown of
transparency and accountability. While the impediments to active
regulation may be framed in terms of resource and personnel
shortages, in practice these are often the result of political choices.132
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Good faith regulators are undermined
Government regulators that seek to enable the sharing of
information with communities to enable their participation in
investment-related decision-making often face pressure and
pushback from more powerful actors. Such actors may be willing
to exert influence to advance the investment at any cost. For
instance, one Central African government interviewee recounted
recommending against approving mining in a particular area and
receiving death threats from a mining company, which was
connected to the Prime Minister. In another instance, a former
head of an environmental agency in West Africa was reportedly
sidelined after measuring a mine’s environmental impacts; they
also described being pressured from a “higher office” to “play
ball” after making a finding that a high-profile agribusiness
plantation violated environmental regulations. In such
circumstances, the ability of good faith regulators to fulfill their
mandates, which can include enforcing obligations for
information sharing and participatory processes, is often limited.
Communities do not control whether or not a project takes
place
Communities are still usually viewed as being subject to
decisions concerning investment, rather than as having rights
to decide whether or not a project can take place and, if so, on
what terms. The international rights of Indigenous and tribal
peoples to free, prior and informed consent (FPIC)133 are often
still elusive in practice. Likewise, international recognition of
the need to respect legitimate tenure rights,134 which include
undocumented customary rights to lands and resources,
remains, in many cases, an aspiration rather than reality.
While courts or ombudsmen have recognized community
rights to FPIC in various contexts,135 many governments
continue to use public purpose expropriations to make way for
investment, or otherwise award concessions before engaging
communities.136 Companies and lenders have proven similarly
resistant to FPIC. Even companies that understand the
importance of stable community relations tend to prefer
consultations to FPIC.137 The IFC has also restrictively
interpreted application of its FPIC standard, applying it in less
than 2% of its entire portfolio.138
In rare cases, however, grievance procedures have led to
companies deferring to community rejections of projects. For

“[Companies] do not ask for your ideas,
they just come and inform you.”
— Community member
Source: IAP, Back to development:
A call for what development could be (2015), 82

example, community grievances issued through the Office of
Accountability of the former Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) led to the suspension of construction of
Mexico’s Cerro de Oro Dam.139 Likewise, a Roundtable on
Sustainable Palm Oil (RSPO) grievance led Olam Gabon to
commit to not using land within its formal concession where
community landholders refused.140
Information and participation can be used by gatekeepers
to dampen pressure for systemic change
While open and participatory processes are needed to enable
communities to obtain and use information, experts have
warned of the risks of viewing participation, especially at the
project level, as a “magic elixir.”141 Gatekeepers may cede to
demands for increased community participation as part of a
strategy to deflate pressure for deeper institutional changes, such
as formal recognition of Indigenous territories or alternative,
community-driven development approaches.142 Participatory
processes like consultations may therefore convert communities’
political demands (for instance, to control their lands and
development) into less transformational procedural ones (for
instance, for disclosure and inclusion in decisions). When
communities are opposed to a project, such procedures create
forums for, at best, contestation and communication: more often,
they enable the further domination of communities by powerful
companies,143 and debilitate legitimate community opposition.144
Having snuffed out pressure for structural change, governments
can simply multiply project-level participatory processes while
ensuring those processes remain disconnected from national
policy debates or formal accountability mechanisms.145 Exclusion
from the policy level in turn limits the boundaries and scope of
what communities can secure through project-level participatory
channels.146 These dynamics reveal the limitations, and even
risks, of focusing on information and project-level participation.
Existing initiatives privilege elite perspectives, rarely
meeting community needs
The experience of existing initiatives with transparency and
governance components show that communities’
transparency needs are unlikely to be met unless communities
are defined as a primary beneficiary of such initiatives.
Initiatives like the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
(EITI) and the EU Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and
Trade (FLEGT) program, both analyzed in detail below, have
led to the release of flurries of data, with the intention of
animating citizen, civil society, and/or commodity buyer use
of such information. The focus on this broad set of
beneficiaries means that these initiatives often fail to enable
communities to better access, understand, and use
information in open decision-making processes and systems.
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BOX 2: THE EXTRACTIVE INDUSTRIES TRANSPARENCY INITIATIVE
The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) was launched in 2002 as a narrow set of rules focused on revenue
transparency in the extractives sector. Since then, EITI has evolved into a global standard implemented by over 50
countries. It is a multi-stakeholder initiative that now requires the disclosure of contracts, license allocations, beneficial
ownership data, and social and economic spending by the private sector, among others, with the aim to “promote open
and accountable management of extractive resources.”147 EITI was created at a time when investigative journalism,
campaigning, and academic literature had brought natural resource management issues to the fore. EITI received highlevel support from the G8 countries, donors and development banks, although oil companies initially argued against
company reporting.148 EITI responded to company concerns by designing the initiative as a level playing field, where all
companies operating in a particular country were required to make the same disclosures.149 Though challenges remain,
EITI has undoubtedly facilitated a “deep normative shift”150 around extractives sector data disclosure.
The evolution of the EITI standard demonstrates how initiatives can build the normative basis for increased disclosure
over time, starting with a narrow set of rules that can generate buy in, which are then progressively developed into a
more comprehensive set of requirements. NGOs have been instrumental in the evolution of the standard, and have
used EITI to initiate broader discussions on transparency and accountability in the extractives sector in different
countries. Scholars have found that successful strategies to broaden the scope of EITI can be attributed to a “layering
technique” that takes small but deliberate steps toward expanding reporting requirements.151
Participation and influence: Who has a seat at the table?
The creation of multi-stakeholder groups (MSGs) in each participating country to oversee implementation of the EITI
standard has led to increased participation of civil society in extractives-related policy discussions at the national and
international level. In some countries, MSGs have facilitated unprecedented access for civil society to engage with
government and the private sector.152 In addition, some NGOs working at the national level have rallied around the EITI
standard to build regional and international networks. Certain better-networked local organizations have also been able
to use their participation to increase their influence at the domestic level and their access to international funding.153
While MSGs have facilitated greater civil society participation in extractives governance, EITI tends to be viewed as an
elite platform that only well-resourced and “professionalized” CSOs can engage with.154 Civil society platforms have
been created in some countries to facilitate participation of more diverse groups.155 But investment-affected
communities—including community leaders who, unlike CSOs, have formal mandates to represent and be accountable
to their constituents—are still excluded from MSGs.156 As a result, disclosure or other transparency gains at the EITI
may be less informed by, or likely to align with, community needs.
Impact
EITI has led to more extractives sector data being made publicly available. The effective use of the data by citizens to
achieve broader goals remains a challenge, however: there is insufficient evidence, for example, that EITI has led to
significant improvements in governance and accountability in countries where it is implemented.157
Lessons from the EITI experience suggest that, in order for future land transparency initiatives to contribute to better
governance, multiple strands of work should be pursued in parallel, focused on efforts that increase data use, open
decision-making processes, and government responsiveness. In order to do this, the politics that underlie the citizenstate relationship must be well understood,158 and the following questions interrogated: What pathways to
accountability exist within a given context? What motivates citizens to organize in a given context? What obstacles do
they face? And how do governments respond?
This textbox was written by Tehtena Mebratu-Tsegaye.
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BOX 3: THE EU FOREST LAW ENFORCEMENT, GOVERNANCE AND TRADE (FLEGT) PROGRAM
The European Union (EU) Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) program is an international multistakeholder effort whose emphasis on governance has been accompanied by a strong emphasis on forestry sector
information disclosure.159
FLEGT establishes arrangements between the European Union and timber-producing countries that seek to address
illegal logging in line with the EU’s 2013 Timber Regulation. The key components of FLEGT are Voluntary Partnership
Agreements (VPAs) — legally binding bilateral trade agreements between the EU and individual timber-producing host
countries. Each VPA establishes standards for the “legality” of timber produced, and accompanying host country
mechanisms to enforce those standards. Some also have annexes that set out disclosure requirements. VPAs and
“legality” definitions vary by country. Each VPA starts with existing host country law as its foundation. The EU and the
host country then agree upon a law reform process, which typically results in reforms that align with EU expectations
of “legality.”160 Once monitoring systems and reforms are implemented and audited, the VPA progresses to a regime
where only licensed product, verified as compliant with host country law, can be exported to the EU.161
While VPAs focus heavily on legality, compliance is primarily encouraged through financial incentives in the form of
access to the EU market.162 To build pressure for compliance with national law, FLEGT also provides technical and
financial resources to support multi-stakeholder processes and improve monitoring by government and, in some
countries, CSOs.163
FLEGT has achieved some success. Encouragingly, seven countries have signed VPAs with the EU and another nine
are currently in negotiations,164 which reportedly involve diverse coalitions representing both powerful and some
disadvantaged parties.165 In addition, the VPAs create binding obligations on host countries to more effectively regulate
timber production.166 The OpenTimberPortal, established to capitalize on FLEGT-related document disclosure by timber
producers, has published substantial amounts of project-related documents and contracts from a range of Central
African countries.167
FLEGT has also been subject to various evidence-based criticisms. Noted shortcomings include: its onerous compliance
mechanisms and barriers to participation by small-scale producers;168 broad producer noncompliance;169 host
government failures to honor transparency commitments and guarantee improved rights-holder participation in
investment-related decision-making;170 low access to information;171 corruption-prone verification mechanisms;172 and
a failure to establish lasting licensing regimes to certify compliance.173
FLEGT’s shortcomings have been attributed to its overreliance on market forces and to pre-existing incentives within
EU and host government bureaucracies, which often prioritize quick and demonstrable results over substantive
change.174 FLEGT has even been described as a “fad,” one of many fleeting initiatives that attract significant donor
resources and attention but then succumb to bureaucratic ambivalence in the absence of immediate results.175 One
critic has asserted that state consolidation and a myopic reliance upon definitions of legality have not only failed to
improve governance, but may in fact be exacerbating inequalities by favoring elite actors.176
Of course, attributing these shortcomings to FLEGT alone ignores the broader context in which VPAs are signed. Most
host countries face intractable social and economic inequalities and political challenges, which FLEGT is not designed,
nor equipped, to resolve. While researchers have identified several strategies for improving the program, such as
expanding access to program data,177 FLEGT’s success will likely continue to be limited by structural factors beyond its
scope. A continuing failure to ground FLEGT’s transparency requirements in the needs of local communities will also
likely limit FLEGT’s potential to bolster community information access and participation in decision-making and
forestry governance.
This textbox was written by William Sommer and Sam Szoke-Burke.
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Small-scale agriculture, Morocco.
© Shutterstock/monticello.

PART VI
RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGES: STRATEGIES TO
ADVANCE MORE EFFECTIVE LAND INVESTMENT

This section explores ways to improve disclosure and access, comprehension, and/or
use of information by community members as empowered participants in open
decision-making processes and governance systems.
These strategies and approaches need to be adjusted to—and their appropriateness
will depend on—the local context,178 taking into consideration potential risks to
community members and their lands (see Part IV, above).
The ideas highlighted will often need to be paired with other important interventions,
such as enhancing community legal literacy and improving access to justice, in order
to empower communities to claim rights, hold others to account, and effect
important changes to relevant governance systems.179

28 |

COLUMBIA CENTER ON SUSTAINABLE INVESTMENT

TRANSPARENCY FOR WHOM? GROUNDING LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY IN THE NEEDS OF LOCAL ACTORS

Each strategy and approach’s potential for impact will be
affected by the likelihood of resistance from gatekeepers,180 or
by the potential to decouple relevant gatekeepers’ influence or
control from such solutions.181 Most of the suggested strategies
and approaches are therefore accompanied with insights into
how gatekeepers might respond.
1. DRIVING AGENDAS WITH COMMUNITY-LED PROCESSES
Communities can set the agenda for transparency by
articulating how decisions should be made concerning their
lands, resources, and development.182 Specific tools for
communities to set agendas include autonomous protocols,183
community bylaws,184 and community-led development
plans.185 These tools can be used to set clear expectations
regarding information sharing, time and support needed, and
how communities expect to be involved in decision-making.
More broadly, protocols, bylaws and development plans can
articulate community priorities concerning self-determination,
the management of lands and resources, customary decisionmaking processes, and visions for development.

“… the consultation protocol serves as an instrument to
give strength… to say we have the right to be consulted in
this way, in this timeframe… it is not you who decides who
is coming to our villages. We decide.”
— Indigenous leader from Brazil
Source: Mebratu-Tsegaye, T., and Kazemi, L., Free, prior and informed
consent: Addressing political realities to improve impact, CCSI (2020), 24

Community agenda-setting may be needed precisely because
communities often are not proactively provided with
information and afforded opportunities to participate in
decision-making. These transparency shortcomings are often
caused by government reluctance to recognize community
rights to control their lands and resources, such as FPIC and
legitimate tenure rights. Instead, governments restrict
information sharing and opportunities for community
participation to preserve governmental control over land
allocation. For example, governments may focus consultations
on the question of compensation, rather than on whether or
not the communities consent to the land being taken. The legal
status of protocols, bylaws and development plans, and the
prospects of gatekeepers respecting them, may vary.
Nonetheless, this proactive step can build pressure for
community inclusion in investment-related decision-making,
and strategically position communities for follow-up responses
where their demands are ignored.

Gatekeeper insights
While governments and companies will usually continue to resist
community demands for the right to decide whether or not
projects take place, protocols, bylaws, and development plans
may be welcomed to the extent that they help gatekeepers
navigate the complex social conditions of local communities.
Even if gatekeepers resist deferring to community decisions
concerning proposed investments, having protocols, bylaws, or
development plans may help open up space to discuss how to
meaningfully feed community insights into ultimate decisions.

2. INCREASING TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR COMMUNITIES
Technical support—from local allies, civil society, and other
experts—is often crucial to enabling communities to access
and understand information and to knowledgably influence
decisions relating to land investments. Types of support often
needed include legal empowerment, help obtaining early
information about projects,186 and support in identifying
lenders, equity investors and insurers linked to projects.187
Technical support can also help communities: develop
protocols, bylaws, and development plans; navigate
consultations, negotiations, and other processes; and more
effectively pursue grievances or seek redress.188
An important part of community support to help access,
understand, and use information is the question how such
support is funded. Given the vast numbers of projectaffected communities around the world and the limited
resources of philanthropic and aid donors, new forms of
funding are needed to enhance community access to
support. The private sector can be a supplementary source
of funding. For instance, resource companies have directly
paid for lawyers189 and anthropologists190 to support
communities, and for facilitators and training to help
address resolve ongoing conflict.191 The RSPO’s Principles
and Criteria also require member companies to ensure that
“FPIC is obtained...with option of resourced access to
independent advice.”192 Yet direct company funding
introduces the risk of actual or perceived undue influence
by the company over the community or its support provider.
A “basket fund” approach, where multiple companies and
other actors pay into an independently-administered facility
that finances community technical assistance, would help
to increase community access to support while managing
the risk of undue influence.193 By increasing community
access to support, a basket fund could help enhance
information access, comprehension, and use in investmentrelated decision-making.
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Gatekeeper insights

Dialogue processes

Increasing community access to technical support cuts both
ways for companies. While companies are wary of facilitating
the entrance of campaigners who bring the prospect of naming
and shaming, some companies regard community technical
support as crucial to inform interactions, set realistic
expectations, and build cooperative relationships between
communities and companies.

Dialogues involve having regular meetings among
stakeholders, and may be implemented at the project-,
landscape-, or national level. Communities can use dialogues
to request and obtain information, share their perspectives
with gatekeepers, build trust, understand different actors’
goals and motivations. Dialogues can also be a vehicle for
communities to use information to influence decisions and
peacefully resolve grievances.196

Several resource company representatives saw a basket fund
for community technical assistance as a good idea. But they
anticipated challenges in actually securing financial
contributions from companies in the absence of binding
requirements, such as loan conditions or performance
standards. Governments may also resist such an effort if they
perceive it as threatening their control over the conduct of
investment;194 involving government—in an appropriate way—
in planning for a basket fund may help to mitigate such risks.

3. EMPOWERING GOOD FAITH REGULATORS
Communities’ ability to access and understand information and
influence decisions can be bolstered by empowering good faith
regulators and other “reformers” within government. Because
such actors often face political barriers to carrying out their
mandates, efforts to empower them must be politically attuned,
rather than focusing solely on skill development. Lessons from
previous attempts at reforming captured sectors reveal that
good faith actors’ influence can be bolstered by linking them
with other credible actors within government and strategic allies
beyond government, such as civil society, the private sector,
religious groups and academia. Such alliances can boost
regulators’ legitimacy or increase their collective influence,
helping to overcome resistance by reluctant gatekeepers.195
4. IMPLEMENTING MULTI-STAKEHOLDER AND
PARTICIPATORY PROCESSES
Multi-stakeholder processes—which involve a combination of
communities, allies, companies, government, and other
actors—can create new avenues for communities to obtain
relevant information, share their perspectives, and seek to
understand and influence decision-makers. While all solutions
come with risks for communities, the risks attached to multistakeholder processes deserve particularly careful
consideration. Such processes can increase the risk of attacks
against participating community representatives, who may
draw attention to themselves when voicing grievances, making
demands, or advocating for potential action.
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Multi-stakeholder dialogues can also bring various challenges.
Dialogues may introduce new political spaces for community
elites to occupy, further marginalizing grassroots perspectives.
Elite community members tasked with both representing all
community members and faithfully reporting back to them
may instead seek to accumulate personal benefits and
influence. For this reason, dialogues should act in coordination
with community-wide meetings or consultations, rather than
replacing them. In addition, dialogues may replicate existing
power imbalances and be subject to domination by
gatekeepers.197 Dialogues can also result in frustration if they
do not lead to improved outcomes.198 An emphasis on
empowered participation by community representatives,
including in deciding on the norms and processes that govern
the dialogue, is therefore critical. The presence of impartial
actors from civil society and reputable public institutions may
also help to engender productive, action-oriented dialogues.199

Gatekeeper insights
While companies are often willing to participate in dialogues, their
objectives in doing so can deeply affect outcomes. While
“performative” and controlling approaches are unlikely to lead to
meaningful dialogue and change,200 companies participating as
part of a commitment to strong community relations may enable
more transformative outcomes for participating communities.201

Joint inspections, monitoring, and fact-finding
The co-production of data by communities, allies and
gatekeepers—whether through joint inspections, monitoring
or fact-finding relating to community grievances—may help
increase community access to information and informed
community participation in decision-making. Joint processes
can correct misleading or inaccurate information, fill evidence
gaps, and build trust and shared understandings between
actors.202 Crucial to the co-production of data is what happens
to it afterwards: communities must have equal access to the
data they help produce, rather than enabling the “extraction”
of such data from communities.203
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Gatekeeper insights
Joint fact-finding has been financed by individual companies204
and facilitated by lender-linked grievance mechanisms,205
indicating some gatekeeper openness. In other instances,
however, companies have instead resisted community entry to
project areas.206 One civil society interviewee reported that
regulators have agreed to joint inspections, but only for smaller
and less politically connected projects.

5. FACTORING COMMUNITY-GENERATED INFORMATION
INTO INVESTMENT-RELATED DECISIONS
While transparency efforts often focus on information
produced by powerful actors, information generation by
communities and their allies has transformative potential—for
communities and land governance more generally.207
Communities producing their own information can feed local
perspectives into decision-making and governance processes,
and highlight deliberately under-examined impacts. This can
help communities to break gatekeepers’ control over the
information upon which decisions are made.208
Community information-generation can take different shapes,
including:
•

Mapping community lands and resources.

•

Monitoring—for illegal activities209 and adverse impacts
of investments.210

•

Community-led human rights impact assessments of
investment projects.211

•

Community-led surveys concerning proposed or current
investments.212

Community information generation can reinforce community
autonomy by increasing gatekeepers’ understanding of the
significance of Indigenous peoples’ and other communities’
relationships with lands and ecosystems213 and their ability to
manage and monitor lands.214 Generating data may also help
communities to shape narratives around how ecosystems and
resources should be used, and to advance community-centric
approaches to land use.

“ [W]e have decided to watch over our lands and forests,
and to get organised to collect and publish information
to tell the world what is going on.”

Community information can also produce significant
governance outcomes. It can reveal rights violations that are
not being addressed by the company or known by the
government or the company’s investors.215 Communities have
therefore responded to government reliance on company data
by calling for processes like environmental and social impact
assessments to include consideration of communitygenerated information.216 Community information can also
help to check inaccurate or misleading information,217 and
resolve factual disputes by filling evidence gaps with crucial
local information.218

“ If the company had surveyed even one local person, they
would have known about the importance of the spring
before they put a waste dump on this spot.”
— Community member
Source: IAP, Back to development: A call for what development could be
(2015), 84.

Gatekeeper insights
Government representatives are sometimes willing to access
community-generated information and such information may
help justify findings by good faith regulators regarding deficient
participatory processes. Nonetheless, gatekeepers within
government may resist any proposal to require them to
incorporate such information into decisions.
Some companies may already factor in community-generated
information. For instance, one mining company—albeit in a
jurisdiction with strong protections of Indigenous rights—is
contractually bound to take community-generated information
“into consideration for all its decisions when considering the
accuracy of impact predictions” and when designing mitigation
measures.219 Other companies view community data with more
skepticism: one interviewee with experience working with
agribusiness and forestry companies noted that companies
would want to verify mapping done by farmers.
Given their removal from the local context, lenders and investors
may find community data helpful for due diligence and the
improvement of risk assessments.220 This may be especially so
given the growing acknowledgement by lenders, noted by a DFI
environmental and social specialist, of a duty to know what is
happening at project sites.221

— Chairperson of the South Rupununi District Council,
Guyana, 2017
Source: Wagnon, J, “Closing the Gap: Rights-based solutions for tackling
deforestation,” Forest Peoples Programme (FPP), Feb. 15, 2018.
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6. INITIATING DOMESTIC MECHANISMS TO INCREASE
PUBLIC ACCESS TO INFORMATION
Domestic governance mechanisms, like “freedom of
information” or “right to information” laws and parliamentary
approval processes for incoming investment, can help increase
disclosures and make decision-making more accountable.222
Communities have, with and without support from allies,
navigated their country’s right to information laws to obtain
information. When visible and accessible to community
members, such laws can increase community access to
information.223 Certain design elements and approaches can
bolster the transformative potential of such laws and minimize
risks to community members. For instance, enabling
anonymous information requests may help minimize the risk
of reprisals.224 Further, a right to information framing can help
emphasize that information access is a human right, and not
something that gatekeepers should be able to control and
arbitrarily curtail.225 Vigilance is also needed against overly
broad exceptions to disclosure and other attacks on the right
to information in contexts of democratic backsliding or
shrinking civic space.
Parliamentarians can build pressure for greater public
disclosure and more inclusive decision-making about
proposed investment projects.226 For instance, including
parliamentarians as part of decision chains in investment
approval may give them more leverage to push for increased
public disclosures by the executive. They can also use existing
parliamentary processes like budget allocation procedures to
access information and push for public disclosure. Of course,
parliamentarians themselves may not always be a force for
increased transparency; a captured parliament may actually
increase the risks of poor transparency.227
7. EXTENDING COMMUNITY PARTICIPATION BEYOND
PROJECTS TO THE POLICY LEVEL
The challenges and limitations of project-level participation
through processes, such as consultations, indicate a need for
communities to also influence the systems and norms that
govern investments and accompanying transparency
requirements. While the passing of laws can be met by serious
deficiencies in implementation, it is still an important step with
wide-ranging ramifications. Enabling community participation
in the development of laws and policies can strengthen
disclosure and community access, comprehension and use of
information in three ways.
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First, communities and allies can directly push for laws and
policies that operationalize information access (such as
through right to information laws) and public participation
(such as through requirements for participatory processes in
the development of impact assessments). Communities and
allies participating in policy and law development can also act
as counterweights to elite influence over policy. They could
therefore help to build and safeguard the norms underpinning
an ecosystem of transparency and good governance, rather
than simply being subject to laws agreed upon by elite actors.
Second, communities can use law and policy processes to
strengthen protections of community rights to give or withhold
their FPIC and legitimate tenure rights. These rights can bolster
community leverage when making demands for information and
participation in investment-related decision-making (as discussed
in 1. Driving agendas with community-led processes, above).
Third, transparency entails open governance systems (see What
is land investment transparency?, above). The development of
laws and policies should therefore be open to the participation
of communities and other rights holders. Community
involvement in law and policy processes can also enhance the
responsiveness of governance systems more broadly.
In determining how to create openings for community
participation in policy development, communities and their
allies can draw inspiration from the experiences of Indigenous
representative bodies and peasants’ movements.228 For
example, Bolivia’s experiment with direct parliamentary
representation of Indigenous peoples,229 while made possible
by unique political circumstances and subject to challenges in
practice,230 could offer inspiration. Similarly, Cameroon’s
LandCam initiative, while still in its early stages, also pursues
a model aimed at bridging communities and policy-level
conversations. The initiative, which focuses on reforming
Cameroonian land governance, encourages the participation
of national and grassroots CSOs, along with Indigenous and
women’s groups and representatives from project-affected
communities, in iterative policy conversations. LandCam also
facilitates dialogue with parliamentarians, policy makers, and
the private sector. Emerging efforts for an Indigenous Voice in
Australia are also grappling with ways to require regular
government engagement with Indigenous perspectives on law
and policy development.231 While these examples may not yet
have led to systemic change or new laws, they demonstrate
potential modalities for how communities can participate in
policy development.
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FIGURE 2: HOW EACH STRATEGY CAN HELP ADVANCE LAND INVESTMENT TRANSPARENCY

Source: Sam Szoke-Burke.
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Community meeting, Guinea Bissau.
© Shutterstock/TLF Images.

PART VII
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The enduring governance and accountability challenges of land investments often
have important links to the poor state of land investment transparency. While a
means to other ends, improved transparency can be as beneficial for communities
as for host governments, companies, and investment chain actors. This report calls
on donors, global policy makers, and CSOs to conceive of transparency not simply
as disclosure of relevant information, but as also including community access,
comprehension, and use of that information in open decision-making processes and
governance systems. Such actors must also design, and situate, transparency efforts
as complements to more transformative governance frameworks, such as human
rights, access to justice, and the protection of legitimate tenure rights.
Set out below are recommendations, organized according to each of the seven strategies
proposed in this report for advancing more effective land investment transparency.
Other more general recommendations follow. In addition to serving as concrete steps
for action, these recommendations are intended to contain seeds for the development
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of additional insights and approaches to improve disclosure and
to enhance communities’ abilities to access, understand, and use
information. In doing so, these recommendations can help to

ground land investment transparency efforts in the needs of the
communities who so often bear the negative effects of land
investments developed without their meaningful involvement.

TABLE 1: RECOMMENDATIONS

Strategy

Recommendation for donors Recommendation for
global policy makers

Recommendation for civil
society organizations

1. Driving agendas with
community-led processes that
set norms and expectations
that advance transparency.
(e.g., processes to develop
autonomous community
protocols, community bylaws,
and community-driven
development plans)
See page 29, above.

Support communities and
their allies to implement
community-led processes.
Support strategies to bolster
gatekeepers’ recognition and
respect of the results of
community-led processes.

Underscore the legitimacy of
community-led processes and
the results of such processes.
Set norms for when, and how,
gatekeepers are required to
incorporate the results of
community-led processes into
decisions.

Continue to raise awareness
about, and support the
implementation of, communityled processes.
Find ways to bolster gatekeepers’
recognition and respect of the
results of community-led
processes.

2. Increasing technical
support for communities.
See pages 29–30, above.

Continue to support efforts to
provide technical assistance to
communities to enable them
to access, understand, and use
information.
Support efforts aimed at
increasing the availability of
technical support, such as a
basket fund for community
support.

Highlight the importance of
community support in fulfilling
rights inherent to transparency,
such as FPIC and the right to
information.
In norms and programs, create
expectations and requirements
for gatekeepers to facilitate and
finance independent community
support.

Continue to support
communities to access and
understand information, and to
knowledgably participate in
investment-related decisions.
Amplify calls for gatekeepers to
finance community support
through mechanisms that
guarantee independence of
support.

3. Empowering good faith
regulators.
See page 30, above.

Support politically savvy efforts
to bolster the influence and
performance of good faith
regulators.

Continue to underscore the
obligations of governments to
regulate investment and enable
land investment transparency.
Develop programs to bolster
the legitimacy and influence of
good faith regulators.

Find politically savvy ways to
support good faith regulators.

4. Implementing multistakeholder and
participatory processes at
the project level.
(e.g., dialogues, joint
inspections, joint
monitoring, and joint factfinding)
See pages 30–31, above.

Critically analyze proposals for
multi-stakeholder processes,
and support those that
address power imbalances and
have a real prospect of
improving information sharing
and informed community
participation in investmentrelated decision-making.

When appropriate, facilitate
multi-stakeholder processes
that address power imbalances
and have a real prospect of
improving information sharing
and informed community
participation in investmentrelated decision-making.

Support communities to
knowledgably participate in
multi-stakeholder processes,
where appropriate.
Continue to explore the potential
for multi-stakeholder modalities to
improve information sharing and
opportunities for communities to
influence decisions.

5. Factoring communitygenerated information into
investment-related
decisions.
See page 31, above.

Support community
Encourage use of communityinformation-generation efforts. generated information as a
legitimate and useful source of
Support efforts to ensure
information for investmentdecision-makers concretely
incorporate such information related decision-making.
into investment-related
Support efforts to ensure that
decisions.
decision-makers concretely
incorporate communitygenerated information into
investment-related decisions.

Support communities to
generate and use information.
Explore and advance ways to
ensure that decision-makers
concretely incorporate such
information into investmentrelated decisions.
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TABLE 1: RECOMMENDATIONS - continued

Strategy

Recommendation for donors Recommendation for
global policy makers

Recommendation for civil
society organizations

6. Initiating domestic
mechanisms to increase
public access to
information.

Continue to support efforts to
enshrine and operationalize
the right to information and,
where appropriate, efforts to
bolster parliamentary
involvement in investmentrelated decision-making.

Continue to advocate for, and
support communities to safely use,
right-to-information processes.

See page 32, above.

Continue to underscore the
importance of the right to
information and mechanisms for
governments to fulfill it in practice.
Continue to articulate the need
to protect against the weakening
of right-to-information processes
and to protect rights holders who
seek to invoke such processes.
Support, when appropriate,
mechanisms for parliamentary
involvement in investmentrelated decision-making.

7. Extending community
participation beyond
project-level to the policy
level.
See page 32, above.

Support efforts to enable
communities to influence the
development of laws and
policies that affect them,
including concerning disclosure,
information access,
comprehension, and use in open
decision-making processes.

Underscore and advance the
rights of communities to
influence the development of
laws and policies that affect
them, and the modalities for
doing so.

Advocate for such processes to be
designed in ways that guard
against the risk of retaliation for
those who invoke them.
Where appropriate, call for
parliamentary involvement in
investment-related decision-making
and support parliamentarians to
increase disclosure and community
participation in decisions.
Find effective and context-specific
ways to enable communities to
influence the development of
laws and policies that affect them,
including concerning disclosure
and information access,
comprehension, and use in open
decision-making processes.

Other transparency
Support efforts that:
Design and implement efforts
Design and implement efforts
interventions, efforts and • conceive of transparency as that:
that:
initiatives.
extending beyond
• conceive of transparency as • conceive of transparency as
(e.g., development
disclosure, to include
extending beyond disclosure,
extending beyond disclosure,
programs and multicommunity access,
to include community access,
to include community access,
stakeholder initiatives)
comprehension, and use of
comprehension, and use of
comprehension, and use of
See pages 8–10, 25–27,
information in open
information in open
information in open processes;
above.
processes;
processes;
and
• are grounded in the needs
of communities and other
local actors; and

On transparency more
generally.
See pages 8–9, above.
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• are grounded in the needs of • are grounded in the needs of
communities and other local
communities and other local
actors; and
actors; and

• seek to navigate, change, or • seek to navigate, change, or
circumvent political
circumvent political barriers.
barriers.

• seek to navigate, change, or
circumvent political barriers.

Strategically support
transparency efforts when they
are needed to complement—or
fill voids created by the
blockage of—more
transformational frameworks
for improving the governance
and accountability of land
investments.

Strategically pursue transparency
when it can productively
complement—or fill voids created
by the blockage of—more
transformational frameworks for
improving the governance and
accountability of land
investments.
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Strategically use transparency
framings and programming to
complement—or fill voids
created by the blockage of—
more transformational
frameworks for improving the
governance and accountability
of land investments.

Build pressure for direct
community participation and
representation in relevant
transparency efforts.
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METHODOLOGY
This report forms part of a portfolio of research conducted by
CCSI on a demand-driven approach to the transparency of land
investments, focusing on the transparency needs of projectaffected communities and host governments. It is based on 36
semi-structured interviews and 12 unstructured interviews and
extensive desktop research, including a focus on literature
produced by, or heavily focused on the perspectives of, projectaffected communities and their local allies. The report also
draws from country-specific field and desktop research on land
investment transparency in Cameroon and Liberia. In addition
to land investments, it draws from experiences in other sectors,
such as infrastructure and the extractive industries.
Interviews were conducted with representatives from projectaffected communities in Cameroon, Guyana, Kenya, and
Liberia, and civil society actors supporting communities in
Argentina, Colombia, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, Ghana, India, Liberia, Mexico, Nepal, Haiti, Sierra
Leone, and Tanzania. Host government representatives
interviewed included officials at ministries of agriculture,
environment, and land, as well as investment promotion
agencies and a special economic zone, and current and former
members of parliament. These government representatives
came from Cameroon, one other Central African country,
Ethiopia, Indonesia, Liberia, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. Private

sector and DFI interviewees included current and former
environmental and social experts, sustainability managers, as
well as representatives focusing on external relations, global
affairs, loans and finance, and responsible investment
stewardship; their interviews drew on experiences with land,
resource, or infrastructure projects in Canada, Ghana, Guinea,
Laos, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mongolia, Nigeria, Sierra
Leone, and South Africa.
CCSI’s broader research portfolio on land investment
transparency benefitted from regular advice and dialogue with
an expert advisory group that included:
•

Joan Carling, Co-Convener of the Indigenous Peoples
Major Group for the SDGs and of the Right Energy
Partnership

•

Nsama Nsemiwe Chikolwa, Land Policy Coordinator for
the African Union

•

Lorenzo Cotula, Principal Researcher on Law and
Sustainable Development at the International Institute
for Environment and Development

•

Erin Kitchell, Director of Global Programs at Namati

•

Megan MacInnes, Scottish Land Commissioner and
former Land Advisor at Global Witness

•

Win Min, Senior Programme Associate for Tourism, ICT,
and Regulatory at the Myanmar Centre for Responsible
Business
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ANNEX: WHAT
INFORMATION
IS NEEDED?

This annex lists known types of information that communities and their allies may need
in the context of land-based investment.232 It is organized temporally according to the
potential life cycle of such investments, though there will be overlap between these
stages. All such information should also be made available in language and formats that
are comprehensible to communities, including non-technical summaries of documents,
as discussed in Information comprehension, above.

Timing Type of information

Before project approval

Before project proposal

Rights and laws, generally
• Individual rights to information, participation, association, and, where relevant, to give or withhold free, prior and
informed consent.
• Community rights to land and other natural resources.233
• Content of laws, regulations, policies, bylaws, and land use plans governing the management of lands and resources,
and investment.
• General understanding of legal frameworks and the range of decision-making processes potentially available.
• Demonstration of how rights and processes have been effectively used in the country or elsewhere.234
Opportunities for land investment by communities
• Ways for communities to participate in, contribute to, and develop their own, proposals for land investments.
Project proposal, implications, and decision-making processes
• The proposed nature, objectives, and size of the project.235
• The location (including boundaries, maps, and geographical coordinates) of the project and any areas that will be
affected, and any neighboring or overlapping projects.236
• Preliminary assessments of the project’s likely negative impacts (such as is contained negative environmental, social,
and human rights impacts), and preliminary plans for avoidance and mitigation of identified negative impacts.
• Preliminary assessments of the project’s likely positive impacts, including information enabling communities to
distinguish between promises and reality.237 Data about benefit spending and employment creation should be
granular and disaggregated to avoid raising expectations, and explain how these will meet the community’s
conception of benefit, rather than the company’s conception.238
• Likely payments to be made to the host government, and how such payments will reach the community.239
• Information about the project’s aftermath, including what the land will be like afterwards and what generational
impacts are likely to occur.240
• Reports commissioned or generated about the project, including impact assessments, baseline studies, scoping
reports, feasibility studies, plans, and other external reviews.
• Plans for stakeholder engagement and community consultation, including how community feedback will be
incorporated into project design.
• Alternative formulations of the project that would minimize potential adverse impacts.241
• Alternative development pathways and comparisons between those and the proposed project.242
Applicable rights, laws, and processes
• Evidence of company compliance with applicable laws.243
• The applicable criteria, procedures and timelines for the assessment, approval and establishment of the investment
and any land conversion.244 This includes permitting, bidding, contracting, the calculation of compensation, and
community consultations.245
• Community rights relating to public purpose expropriations and forced resettlement.
• All authorizations and permits, and contracts, including investor-state contracts, community-investor contracts, and
associated subcontracts and documents with intermediary actors or other landholders.246
• All government entities involved in authorizing and regulating the investment project, including contact information
for relevant individuals at each entity.247
• Applicable avenues to seek additional access to information established domestically or by the company, investment
chain actors, or value chain actors like buyers.
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Timing Type of information
The company (or companies) carrying out the project
• The company’s directors, shareholders and beneficiaries, parent and associated companies, incorporation details and
related documents, company addresses both in the host country and, if the company is foreign-owned, the company’s
country of domicile.
• The involvement in the company of any “politically exposed persons”—those entrusted with prominent public
functions within the host country.248
• The company’s membership in any certification bodies, sustainability initiatives, and industry associations.
• Relevant company policies, codes of conduct, and decision-making processes, including community engagement and
consultation plans and processes, and grievance mechanisms.249
• The company's relevant track record and experience. This includes: past involvement in any disputes regarding, or
violations of, tenure or human rights; any other negative environmental or social impacts; and any past illegal, corrupt,
or unethical conduct; previous experience with similar types of projects; histories of solvency, acquisition and
abandonment of projects; and copies of the company’s recent financial statements or, if it is a new company, bank
statements showing the capital secured for the investment.
• Contact information for the company’s lead on investment.

Before project approval

Updates on company conduct and project impacts
• Timely and predictable updates on changes and progress made for any of the above.
• Regular “refreshes” of explanations to communities regarding the terms of the above, maintenance of ongoing access
to documents, and provision of information that is lost or otherwise no longer available.256
• The terms of royalties and other transfers to be made to the community, regardless of whether such terms are
included in community-company agreements or other instruments.
• Regular, timely and meaningfully disaggregated reporting on: company production and profits;257 compliance with
laws and contracts; benefits shared and transfers made both to community members and government entities;258
negative impacts caused and measures taken to address those; modalities for ongoing community participation in
decision-making, dialogue processes, and grievance mechanisms.

After the project

Buyers and other value chain actors
• Lists of actual and intended purchasers of the commodities produced, and other actors in the supply chain. This
includes traders, who buy commodities from companies and sell on to manufacturers and other end users, entities
that buy commodities for their own production purposes, and intermediaries who may play a connective role in
connecting agricultural producers to end users.251 It also includes contractors who provide services or carry out jobs on
behalf of the project.252
• Information about likely and intended destination countries for the commodities.253

During the project

Investment chain actors and financiers
• The project’s lenders, equity investors, and insurers. This should include disclosures of involvement by financial
institutions that invest via intermediary institutions.250
• Applicable performance standards and other conditions applying to the company.
• Contact information for project leads at relevant lenders, investors and insurers.

Available avenues for grievance redress
• Domestic legal and administrative avenues for redress.254
• Applicable non-judicial grievance mechanisms established by, or otherwise linked to, the company, its lenders and
investors, their customers, and certification and sustainability initiatives.255

What will happen after the project ends
• Who the land will revert to following the company’s exit, and the process for returning control of the land.
• Responsibilities, and the process, for rehabilitating any damage to the land caused by the investment.
• Remedy pathways for any right violations or losses incurred, and avenues for obtaining those.
• How any benefit sharing or community development arrangements linked to the project will be affected by the
company’s exit, and arrangements for the continuation or winding down of remaining reserves.
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“Rather than assuming that transparency in itself will help
improve governance or accountability, we must ask the
question, “for whom?” Drawing on research in Cameroon,
Liberia, and from around the globe, this report calls on donors,
global policy makers, and civil society organizations to ground
transparency efforts in the perspectives of local actors.
This means conceiving of transparency not simply as disclosure
of relevant information, but as also including community
access, comprehension, and use of that information in open
decision-making processes and governance systems.”
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